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Abstract
We study the effect of the social stratification on the wealth distribution on a
system of interacting economic agents that are constrained to interact only within
their own economic class. The economical mobility of the agents is related to its
success in exchange transactions. Different wealth distributions are obtained as a
function of the width of the economic class. We find a range of widths in which
the society is divided in two classes separated by a deep gap that prevents further
exchange between poor and rich agents. As a consequence, the middle wealth class
is eliminated. The high values of the Gini indices obtained in these cases indicate
a highly unequal society. On the other hand, lower and higher widths induce lower
Gini indices and a fairer wealth distribution.
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economic classes
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Several models of capital exchange among economic agents have been recently
proposed(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) trying to explain the emergence of power law dis-
tributions of wealth obtained by Pareto more than a century ago(7) . In his
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original work, Pareto analyzed the distribution of the income of workers and
companies in different countries, and asserted that in all countries and times
the distribution of income and wealth follows a power law behavior, where
the cumulative probability P (w) of people whose income is at least w is given
by P (w) ∝ w−α, with 1.2 ≤ α ≤ 1.9 (7). Recent international empirical data
suggest that Pareto’s distribution provides a good fit to the income distribu-
tion of different countries in the range of high income. Nevertheless, it does
not agree with observed data over low and middle range of income, for which
different distributions were proposed (5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12).
Most of the models consider an asymmetric probability that the poorer agent
might be privileged in the exchanges. Increasing the probability of favoring
the poorer agent is a way to simulate the action of the state or of some
type of regulatory policy that tries to redistribute the resources (4; 13; 14;
15). Moreover, almost all these models consider exchanges of agents picked
up either at random (16), or following an extremal dynamics (14; 17). The
obtained distribution is a Gibbs-exponential type in most cases, being the
results in good agreement with real distributions of welfare states (15). Other
authors have proposed models in which agents have a risk aversion (1; 3; 4; 16).
The effect of this factor on the wealth distribution also gives rise to a Gibbs-
exponential distribution in most cases and shows a power law behavior in some
limits (3; 16).
All those models have a common point: no correlations between the wealth
of the agents and the probability of interaction between them are considered.
However, the fact that people tends to strongly interact mainly with others
of their own social and economic class, might be a determinant factor in the
wealth distribution of a population. An example of that is the work of Inaoka
et al. (18). They analyzed the exchanges in Japanese banks and found that big
banks have more interactions between them and with the others than the small
ones. A work by two of the present authors considers this fact by including a
correlation between the success of an agent in their economics exchanges and
his degree of connectivity (19).
In this paper we consider a society in which agents are constrained to interact
with others that belong to the same economic class. We introduce a parameter
that establish the maximum difference in wealth two agents can have in order
to interact. This kind of approach was previously used to study the formation
of a public opinion as the result of social interactions (20).
We consider a population of N interacting agents characterized by a wealth
wi and a risk aversion factor βi. We chose as initial condition for both these
parameters a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 (21). For each agent i,
the number [1 − βi] measures the percentage of wealth he is willing to risk.
We consider this percentage as an individual fixed parameter in the whole
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process. But while the value of βi remains fix, the value of wi = wi(t) will
change as a consequence of the interactions. At each time step t we first select
the two agents that will exchange resources in the following way: we choose
at random one agent i and, also at random, a second one j that belongs to
the same economic class of agent i. It means that agent j is randomly chosen
from the subset of the system for which |wi(t) − wj(t)| < u. The parameter
u measures the “width” of the economic class, and determines the number of
agents that can interact with agent i at the time t. We also establish that no
agent can earn more than the amount he puts at stake. Then, the quantity to
be exchanged is the minimum value of the available resources of both agents,
i.e., dw = min[(1 − βi)wi(t); (1 − βj)wj(t)]. Finally, following previous works
we consider a probability p ≥ 0.5 of favoring the poorer of the two partners
(4; 16),
p =
1
2
+ f ×
|wi(t)− wj(t)|
wi(t) + wj(t)
, (1)
where f is a factor going from 0 (equal probability for both agents) to 1/2
(highest probability of favoring the poorer agent). Thus, in each interaction
the poorer agent has probability p of earn a quantity dw, whereas the richer
one has probability 1− p.
When performing the simulation with these rules, after a transient the system
arrives to a stationary state where the wealth has been redistributed. We
present numerical simulations for a system of N = 104 - 105 agents, and
several values of f and u. Stationary state analysis where made after t = 105N
interactions.
We first describe the process of economic exchange between agents. As we
stated before, at t = 0 each agent receives a wealth in the interval [0, 1]. As time
evolves, exchanges between agents generate a redistribution of wealth that,
although dependent on the values of f and u, presents some common features.
The first one is that in all the cases the number of people with very low income
increases. As the model is conservative, the resources of impoverished agents
contribute to increase the wealth of other agents. For low values of f a sharp
peak appears for income equal to zero. This means that a significative fraction
of the population had quickly lost all their resources. The exchange process
is different for high values of f and u: a maximum appears for intermediate
wealths and the distribution at long times seems to be fairer.
A better characterization of this model can be done by analyzing the stationary
states obtained as average of several runs with different seeds and the same
value of the parameters involved. Results are shown in Fig. 1 for a system of
N = 105 agents and 100 runs for each family of parameters. For very small
values of u a peak in w = 0 is obtained, as well as a rather flat distribution for
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Fig. 1. Stationary states for a system of N = 105 and several values of f and u.
Each curve correspond to an average of 100 runs. Note that the minimum of the
gap corresponds to w ∼ u.
higher values of wealth. This means that very narrow classes prevent any kind
of redistribution. In other words, there is a irreversible and strong transfer of
income from lower to higher classes. The high peak for income zero is present
for low and intermediate values of u when the probability of favoring the
poorer agent is low (f = 0.1 in the figures). Only for a very high value of u
the distribution is more uniform, with a peak for intermediate values of w.
For f = 0.1 and 0.3 the peak in w = 0 disappears for u & 100, whereas for
f = 0.5 it happens for u ∼ 1. But more interestingly, for all the values of
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f studied we found an intermediate range of u in which a formation of two
classes is obtained. One class correspond to agents with a very small wealth,
whereas the other is formed by rich agents. The two classes are separated by
a gap that prohibits further wealth exchanges between the low and the high
classes. This has as a consequence the elimination of the middle wealth class.
The minimum of the gap happens for w ∼ u, suggesting that the permitted
range of interaction appears as a scale for the system. This polarization of
the agents in two classes reminds the polarization of opinions that has been
observed, for example, in Ref.(20) (in spite of the fact that the rules to change
opinions are different that the present ones to change the wealth). For big
enough values of u no gap is observed, as very few agents can attain a high
wealth. The obtained distribution is similar to the model without restrictions
(16).
The gap between classes is also observed in the plots of the correlation between
wealth and risk aversion of Fig. 2. We have represented a particular snapshot
of a stationary state configuration. For low values of f (f = 0.1 in the plot)
the poorest people have practically zero wealth and, consequently, they are
not seen in the logarithmic plot. For u = 0.05 a gap appears in all the range of
β, being much wider in the region β < 0.5. This means that agents with a low
risk-aversion can be only very rich or very poor in the stationary state (the last
ones do not appear in the plot). For u = 100 we find a distribution in which
agents with high values of beta are in the middle class, as expected for agents
that do not risk their assets, while the richest and poorest agents are those
with very low values of the risk aversion parameter β. The intermediate values
of β assures agents in all the range of wealth, whereas the poorest agents have
the lowest risk-aversion (again, they do not appear in the plot).
The situation changes if the probability of favoring the poorer agent is high
(f = 0.5 in the plot). For u = 0.05 the gap between the upper and low classes
is present in all the range of β and can be clearly observed in the plot because
the poorest agents have a low but finite wealth in the stationary state. Agents
with the lowest values of β may be in the richest or poorest stripe of the
population. A higher value of the threshold (u = 100 in the plot) does not
present a gap. The richest and poorest agents are those with very low values
of the risk aversion parameter β.
Finally, in Table 1 we show the Gini coefficients for the parameters studied.
As can be observed, the highest values correspond to the intermediate range
of u, where the gap is present. Only for high values of f and u we obtain Gini
indexes close to the ones obtained from data of different countries: while the
Gini index that we obtain can go very close to 1, the highest values observed
in real societies are of the order of 0.7.
We analyze the behavior of a society in which agents are constrained to interact
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Fig. 2. Logarithmic plot of a snapshot of wealth w vs. risk aversion β for a population
of N = 105 agents. Values of u and f are indicated in each panel. Each point
corresponds to an agent. For f = 0.1 agents with very low wealth (w ∼ 0) are not
visible in the logarithmic plot.
f — u 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.5 1 5 10 100
0.1 0.819 0.916 0.952 0.963 0.982 0.992 0.987 0.976 0.915
0.3 0.819 0.840 0.953 0.964 0.978 0.971 0.920 0.840 0.674
0.5 0.818 0.915 0.950 0.974 0.962 0.932 0.690 0.488 0.472
Table 1
Gini coefficients for the three values of f treated in the article and several values
of u. The columns in each case correspond to the different values of u whereas the
rows correspond to the different values of f .
with others that belong to the same economic class. We use a simple model
that includes the existence of risk aversion and an asymmetric probability that
the poorer agent might be privileged in the exchange. Moreover, we introduce
a parameter u that defines the maximum range in wealth for two agents to
interact. We studied the evolution of these systems and found different wealth
distributions depending on the values of the parameters u and f . For all the
values of f studied, we find a range of u in which the society is divided in two
classes separated by a deep gap that prevents further exchange between them.
This gap is related to the lack of opportunity of the poorer agents to ascend
to a class economically higher. It is important to note that this “opportunity
gap” is conceptually different to the poverty gap widely studied, which has to
do with the existence of poor and rich agents. The main consequence of this
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wealth redistribution is the disappearance of the middle class. We remark that
we tried to fit the obtained wealth distributions with Gibbs-like or power law
functions. While for low values of u a power law tail appears over a narrow
band of wealth values, for high values of u an exponential law provides a
better fit. We also calculated the Gini coefficients of the stationary wealth
distributions and find that low and high values of u present a fairer wealth
distribution than intermediate values.
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